THE NAVY IN THE CIVIL WAR
Published
1883, 1885
------------------------
VOLUME I
THE
BLOCKADE AND THE CRUISERS
BY
JAMES RUSSEL SOLEY
PROFESSOR, U.S. NAVY
CHAPTER
VII
THE COMMERCE-DESTROYERS
The
Confederate naval authorities early recognized that the most vulnerable point of
their enemy, as a maritime power, lay in his merchant marine. In 1861 the United
States still occupied the second place among commercial nations. Of the total
registered. tonnage, however, less than one-tenth belonged to the seceding
States; and this rapidly disappeared. In a warfare against commerce, the
Confederates could strike heavy blows, without fear of being struck in return.
Accordingly, it was against commerce that they immediately took the offensive;
and they maintained their position until the end of the war-after the end, in
fact. The Federal Government, on the other hand, could not make use of
commerce-destroyers, because there was no enemy's commerce to destroy. It
follows that the history of the ocean warfare during the conflict falls
naturally into a recital of the doings of Southern cruisers.
The policy of
systematic operations against the merchant fleet of the United States was
adopted at the outset. As early as April 17, 1861, Davis published his famous
proclamation, announcing his purpose of issuing letters-of-marque. At this time, the practice of privateering had been
somewhat discredited by the general concurrence of European States in the
Declaration of the Congress of Paris. But the Southern leaders counted upon a
support abroad that would not be weakened by the influence of sentimental
considerations; and as the United States had not subscribed the Declaration,
neither party was bound by its articles. When the circular invitation of the
Powers was sent to this Government in 1856, Secretary Marcy proposed to amend
the rules by the addition of a new article, exempting private property at sea
from capture. No action was taken on the proposal, and the negotiations were
suspended until President Lincoln's accession to office. About a week after
Davis's proclamation was issued, the Department of State instructed the Minister
of the United States at London to reopen negotiations, and offered to accede
unconditionally to the Declaration. This proposal seemed to point too strongly
to an effort to clothe Southern privateering with an illegal character, and the,
British Government refused to make an agreement which should be applicable to
the existing war. As the United States were thus debarred from any present
advantage to be derived from the adoption of the rule, the whole question was
dropped.
A volunteer
navy may in some degree supply the place of privateers, supposing that plenty of
time and an elastic organization are at command, with a flourishing merchant
marine upon which to draw; but at the South, in 1861, there was no merchant
marine. Still less was there time or organization. In fact, the scheme of a
volunteer navy was tried by the Confederate Government later in the war, and
proved a signal failure. Accordingly, the naval administration of the
Confederacy was wise in turning over its work to private parties, and thus
saving its own energies. The ocean was covered with an unsuspecting and
unprotected commerce, which lay at the mercy of any one whose hostile intentions
were backed by a single gun. Few and indifferent as were the vessels available
for privateering, a score of prizes had been brought into New Orleans by the end
of May, six weeks after the issue of the proclamation.
It was
necessary to decide at the outset in what light the acts of the Southern
privateers should be regarded. Though the Confederate Government was recognized
by the courts as belligerent, and a state of war was held to exist, the legal
authority of the United States over its subjects could not come to an end, even
while these subjects were enemies. According to the strict legal view, neither
the fact of a civil war, nor its express recognition, involved any abrogation of
the powers of the Government over its subjects in revolt. The Constitution
defines treason to be the levying of war against the United States and giving
aid and comfort to the enemies thereof; and it was competent for the State to
bring to trial for treason those whose acts came within the constitutional
definition. But the insurrection assumed such large proportions in the
beginning, and was directed by such complete governmental machinery, that every
consideration of policy and necessity, as well as of humanity and morality,
prescribed a course of action under which the insurgents should be treated as
belligerents, and, when captured, as prisoners of war.
An attempt
was made to put those engaged in hostilities at sea upon a different footing,
and to bring them to trial for piracy. The proclamation of April 19 gave
expression to this principle. In it the President said:
"And I
hereby proclaim and declare that if any person under the pretended authority of
the said States, or under any other pretence, shall molest a vessel of the
United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held
amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of
piracy."
The policy of
the Government, as set forth in the proclamation, was never carried out, because
it was found to be impracticable. Certain of the crews of the captured
privateers were tried, and as their acts fell specifically under the provisions
of the law defining piracy, conviction was in some cases obtained; but the
Confederate authorities threatened retaliation, and they were in a position to
carry out their threat. The Government therefore went no further with its
prosecutions. Nor is it clear, if they had continued, upon what ground they
could have been justified. The fact that the war was a civil war afforded no
reason for a distinction between combatants at sea and combatants on land. As
naval warfare is no more criminal than land warfare, those captured in the one
occupation are as much entitled to be treated as prisoners of war as those
captured in the other. The only explanation of the prosecution of the "
Savannah pirates," as the reports designate them, is the fact that the
Government, having taken a definite position in the proclamation of April 19,
before the magnitude of the insurrection was fully realized, was unwilling to
recede until the courts had sustained its action.
During the
first year of the war the privateers met with moderate success. A considerable
number of small vessels were fitted out, old slavers, tugs, fishing-schooners,
revenue cutters, and small coasters of all descriptions. Many of them would lie
securely in the inlets on the coast of the Carolinas, and issue forth when they
sighted a stray merchantman off the coast, returning to cover when they had made
their capture. Others went to work more boldly, but nearly all had a short
career. The brig Jeff Davis, a
condemned slaver, after cruising off the New England coast and making several
valuable prizes, was wrecked on the coast of Florida. The Beauregard, a Charleston schooner, was captured by the U. S. bark W.
G. Anderson. The schooner Judah
was burnt at her wharf, at the Pensacola Navy Yard, by a party of officers and
men from the flagship Colorado. The
Savannah, a Charleston pilot-boat of fifty-four tons, was captured when
three days out by the brig Perry, one
of the blockading force, and was carried into New York, where the trial of her
crew for piracy led to the threat of retaliation upon prisoners in Southern
hands. The Petrel, which had formerly
been a revenue cutter, was sunk by a shell from the frigate St.
Lawrence, cruising off Charleston.[1]
In spite of
the successes of the sailing-vessels of the navy against the early privateers,
it took some time to drive off or capture all these mosquitoes of ocean warfare.
In fact, the practice of privateering may be said to have died out rather than
to have been broken up. The blockade was indirectly instrumental in killing it.
Its principal object was gain, but there was little to be gained when prizes
could not be sent into port. The occupation of commerce-destroying pure and
simple, however useful and patriotic, is not lucrative; and it was therefore
left to the Confederate naval officers, who took it as a part of their duties.
The privateers hitherto employed in it were soon diverted to the more profitable
pursuit of carrying contraband. The work which they had abandoned was then taken
in hand by the Confederate Government, and it was carried on by the navy during
the Test of the war with results that exceeded the most sanguine expectations.
The first, or
nearly the first, of the regularly commissioned naval vessels, as distinguished
from the privateers, was the Sumter.
Indeed, she was one of the first vessels of any kind fitted out for hostile
purposes at the South, as Semmes was ordered to command her on the 18th of
April, 1861. She was a screw-steamer of five hundred tons, and was lying at New
Orleans, being one of a line of steamers plying regularly between that port and
Havana. The frame of the vessel was strengthened, a berth-deck was put in, the
spar-deck cabins were removed, and room was found for a magazine and additional
coal-bunkers. She was armed with an VIII-inch
pivot-gum between the fore and main masts, and four 24-pound howitzers in
broadside.
Semmes had
hoped to get his vessel out before the blockade began; but on the 26th of May
the Brooklyn appeared off the mouth of
the river, where she was soon after joined by the Powhatan. Later, the Massachusetts
and South Carolina were added to the squadron, and both the passes were
closed.
The Sumter
was not ready for sea until the 18th of June. At this date, she dropped down the
river to the forts, and thence to the Head of the Passes, where she remained at
anchor for nearly a fortnight, watching for an opportunity to run out. Here
Semmes had every advantage, as he could obtain accurate information of the
movements of the blockading vessels, while they were ignorant of his presence.
The Brooklyn had made an effort to ascend the river, but after grounding
once or twice gave up the attempt. If the vessels could have taken a position at
the Head of the Passes, they might have guarded securely all the outlets,
instead of keeping up an imperfect blockade while lying off the bar at the
different mouths. Twice a report that one or another of the blockaders had left
her station led Semmes to run down one of the Passes; but each time he failed to
escape. The second time he remained in Pass-a-Loutre, a few miles from the bar,
unobserved by the Brooklyn; and after
a few hours of waiting, at a moment when the latter had left her anchorage in
chase of a sail, he made for the mouth of the Pass. The Brooklyn,
upon sighting him, left her chase, and attempted to head him off; but he reached
the bar and got out to sea. The Brooklyn
followed, and carrying sail and steam, was still gaining on him; but by hauling
up a couple of points, Semmes brought the wind so far ahead that his pursuer
took in her sails, and she gradually dropped astern, having lost the opportunity
of destroying, at a single blow, nearly the whole sea-going navy of the
Confederacy.
When only
three days out, the Sumter made her
first prize, the bark Golden Rocket,
which was burnt. By the 6th of July, or in less than a week after running the
blockade, she had captured seven other merchantmen. One of these was ordered to
New Orleans with a prize-crew, and was recaptured. The remaining six were taken
in to Cienfuegos, where they were afterward released by the Spanish authorities.
During the next two months, the Sumter
cruised in the Caribbean Sea, and along the coast of South America. She received
friendly treatment in the neutral ports which she visited, and was allowed to
stay as long as she liked. She coaled without hindrance at Curagao, Trinidad,
Paramaribo, and Maranham. Only at Puerto Cabello, in Venezuela, was she required
to depart after forty-eight hours. There was no concealment about her character
or her movements; but none of the vessels that were sent in pursuit of her were
able to find her. Among these were the Niagara
and the Powhatan, from the Gulf
Squadron, and the Keystone State, Richmond,
Iroquois, and San Jacinto.
After leaving
Maranham, Semmes shaped his course fof the calm-belt. Here he expected to
overhaul many merchantmen; but he only captured two, both of which he burnt.
Neither was an important capture, except that from one of them the Sumter was
enabled to replenish her stock. of fresh provisions.
After two
months of cruising in the Atlantic, the Sumter put in to St. Pierre, in the
island of Martinique, for coal and water. She had been here only five days when
the Iroquois came in, a very fast
sloop-of-war, under Captain Palmer. The usual warnings in regisrd to the
neutrality of the port were administered by the French authorities, and the
American sloop, after reconnoitering the Sumter
closely, came to anchor. Finding that the rule forbidding either vessel to leave
port within twenty-four hours of the other would be rigidly enforced, Palmer
lost no time in getting under way again, to take a position outside. The coast
at St. Pierre, forms an open roadstead, twelve miles wide; and here Palmer
waited, standing off and on, as near as he could venture without laying himself
open to the charge of hovering within neutral waters. So matters remained for a
week.
On the night
of the 23d of November, when the Sumter
had finished all her preparations, she weighed anchor and stood out.
Arrangements lied been made for signalling her movements from one of the
American schooners in port; and Semmes, with his quick perception and ready
resource, took advantage of the fact to throw his enemy off the scent. Heading
for the southern point of the roads, he held his course until he was sure that
the Iroquois was following the signal
lights; then doubling suddenly, he returned under cover of the land, and
stopping from time to time, he succeeded in giving Palmer the slip. A fortunate
rain-squall concealed his movements, and in half an hour he was running under a
full head of steam for the northern end of the island, while the Iroquois was chasing furiously' to the southward. In a little while
she discovered the ruse, and retraced her course; but the Sumter was not to be
seen, and Palmer, despairing of finding her, made his way to St. Thomas.
The Sumter
now cruised to the eastward with moderate success. Three prizes were taken and
burnt. Bad weather came on, and after a time it became necessary to make a port
and refit. Cadiz was selected, and thither the ship proceeded, arriving early in
January. The Spaniards showed no disposition to have her remain long, and after
being docked and repaired she sailed for Gibraltar. On the way she made two
prizes, one of which was burnt, and the other, having a neutral cargo, was
ransomed.
The career of
the Sumter now came to an end. She had
no coal, and neither the government nor the private dealers would furnish a
supply. The vessel herself was hardly in a condition to go to sea, and the
question of transferring her officers to a new ship had been considered, when
the Tuscarora arrived at Gibraltar.
Taking her station at Algeciras, on the Spanish coast, the Tuscarora set on foot an effectual blockade of the Confederate
cruiser. Later the Kearsarge and the
Ino arrived. In view of serious defects in the boilers, and of the other
unfavorable circumstances, the Sumter was condemned by a survey, and afterward
sold. She became subsequently a blockade-runner. During her cruise she had made
seventeen prizes, of which two were ransomed, seven were released in Cuban ports
by order of the Captain-General, and two were recaptured. Apart from the delays
caused by interrupted voyages, the total injury inflicted by the Sumter upon
American commerce consisted in the burning of six vessels with their cargoes.
One of the
half-dozen vessels which had been sent in search of the Sumter was the screw-sloop San
Jacinto, commanded by Captain Charles Wilkes. Early in November, 1861, the San
Jacinto was at Havana. The Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell, had
shortly before arrived at that place, having been brought to Cardenas by the
famous blockade-runner Theodora. They were to take passage for St. Thomas in the
British mail-steamer Trent, a vessel
belonging to a regular line of steamers between Vera Cruz and St. Thomas. Wilkes
left Havana on the 2d, having formed the intention of intercepting the steamer
and seizing the commissioners.
The Trent
sailed on the 7th, and on the next day she was brought to in the Bahama Channel
by the San Jacinto. A shot was fired across her bow, and as she continued
on her course it was followed by a shell. When the Trent stopped, Lieutenant Fairfax was sent on board, with orders to
bring off the commissioners and their secretaries. As they refused to come
except under constraint, another boat was sent to the steamer in charge of
Lieutenant Greer, with a party of marines, and the four passengers were removed.
The difficult task of carrying out his instructions was performed by Lieutenant
Fairfax with discretion and forbearance, though there was much to have provoked
a man of less coolness and self-command. The mail-agent on board the Trent,
a retired Commander of the British Navy, was noisy in his demonstrations, and
the bearing of the people on board was offensive and irritating. According to
the joint statement made by the commissioners, many of the passengers became
highly excited, and gave vent to the strongest expressions of indignation,
seeming to indicate a purpose of resistance on their part; "and a slight
movement was made by the guard of marines, which checked the disturbance. The
affair was conducted with as much good order and propriety as such a proceeding
would admit.
The prisoners
were taken to Fort Warren, but were subsequently given up to the British
Government. The Navy Department, somewhat prematurely, gave Captain Wilkes an
emphatic commendation. But the Secretary of State, who was more fully acquainted
with the current of opinion in England, and who saw the slender barrier that
stood in the way of war, avoided committing himself. He wrote to Mr. Mams that
the act had been performed without instructions from the government, and that
nothing had been done on the subject to anticipate discussion. This immediate
disavowal of the act, made under no demand or pressure, enabled the government,
when it was called upon to take a definite position, to yield becomingly to Earl
Russell's request that the prisoners should be released.
Indeed, there
was nothing else to be done. After the first burst of satisfaction was over, the
more Wilkes's act was looked at in the light of sober reason, the less could it
be justified. It consisted in the removal of four persons from a neutral vessel
making a voyage between neutral ports, because they occupied an official station
under the Confederate Government. Such an act has no foundation in international
law or usage. The United States, in particular, have always maintained the
opposite principle, and in 1812 they had even gone to war to maintain it, as
against the English doctrine of the right of impressment. This fact was turned
to account by Seward in the elaborate review of the case presented by him to the
British Government, after the latter had demanded the release of the
commissioners; and it was shown that Great Britain, by condemning the act of
Wilkes, had for the first time acknowledged the illegality of her ancient
practice.
The question
whether the vessel herself was or was not liable to capture is one to which
international law does not make a definite answer. The rule, roughly stated,
which has the general support of text-writers, declares that neutral vessels
employed in transporting persons or dispatches of the enemy, in connection with
the operations of war, are liable to capture and condemnation. But the rule is
subject to many important limitations, and as far as precedent is concerned, it
rests exclusively upon ten cases, decided in the English Admiralty Court between
1802 and 1810, in seven of which the vessels were condemned. The judgments of
Lord Stowell in these cases may be said to have created the rule. None of them
covered exactly the case of the Trent, though in one or two there were enough points of resemblance
to make the question a fair subject of consideration by a prize-court.
But the question could only be brought before a court by capturing the vessel
and sending her in for adjudication.
Wilkes
probably had some such idea in his mind, for he excused his release of the Trent
by referring to his want of force, and to the inconvenience that would be caused
by the detention of the passengers and mails. The first reason was under the
circumstances hardly applicable. The second, commendable as was its motive,
could not justify Wilkes in allowing the Trent
to proceed, if the rule applied to her, and if there was a reasonable suspicion
of her guilt. If there was no such suspicion, his only course, according to
every principle and precedent, was to release her as he found her, with all her
cargo and occupants intact. The course which he adopted, though it seemed from
his point of view to be a middle course, and therefore the safest, was really no
middle course at all. It was a proceeding of a totally different character from
either of the others. Its clear illegality was clue to the principle, of which
Wilkes lost sight for the moment, that the captor of a neutral vessel has no
right to concern himself as to the persons who may be therein, except so far as
their presence may afford a ground for the capture; and that the only question
for him to decide is whether the vessel can be charged with any illegal act,
and, according to the decision, to release her or make her a prize.
The action
taken by the British Government, upon receiving news of the event, was summary
in the extreme. It was no new thing for the naval officers of a belligerent to
commit an error by which a temporary injury resulted to a neutral. The usual
course under such circumstances is for the injured party to make proper
representations, assuming that the act was the error of a subordinate; upon
which a disavowal is made, and in cases demanding it an apology and reparation,
and with this the affair ends. All this was done in the case of the Trent;
and though the representations of the British Government were made in suitable
form, and some discretion was left with Lord Lyons as to his action, yet the two
despatches sent by Earl Russell on the 30th of November were in reality not the
opening of a negotiation, but an ultimatum. At the same time, every preparation
for war was set on foot; vessels were fitted out, and troops were ordered to
Canada; and the whole community, aroused by these measures, thought itself
already on the verge of hostilities. Mr. Seward's despatch, written on the same
day with Earl Russell's ultimatum, and communicated to the latter by Mr. Adams,
gave ample assurance that the injury, such as it was, proceeded from the mistake
of an individual. But this fact was concealed, after the despatch had been
received, and the preparations were continued. Of course the moral effect of
these preparations was to arouse a sympathy for the Southern cause throughout
the length and breadth of England; and without further comment on the position
of the English Government, it is enough to say that had it been influenced at
this time by unfriendly motives, it could hardly have adopted a more unfriendly
course of action.
Long before
the cruise of the Sumter was over, the Confederate Government saw that it would
be unable to build suitable cruising ships-of-war at home, and took steps to
procure them abroad. Under the rules of international law, however, ships-of-war
are or ought to be difficult things for a belligerent to obtain from a neutral.
They stand on a footing by themselves, quite different from that of other
contraband articles. For supplies of ordinary contraband, furnished by its
subjects, a neutral State is not responsible, and the subjects who carry on such
a trade do it at their own risk, and are not interfered with by their
government. But the construction of a belligerent vessel fitted for purposes of
war falls outside the class of acts which foreign subjects may perform
consistently with the neutrality of their governments; and according to the rule
embodied in the Treaty of Washington, though not acknowledged by Great Britain
to have been in force during the Civil War, "a neutral government is bound
to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its
jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended
to cruise or carry on war against a power with which it is at peace; and also to
use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel
intended to cruise or to carry on war as above, such vessel having been
specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike
use."
Whether this
rule was a part of international law in 1861 or not, a rule somewhat approaching
it was generally accepted, and found expression in the neutrality laws of
different States. The British statute then in force imposed a penalty for the
"equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming" of a vessel with the
intent that the vessel should cruise or commit hostilities against a friendly
State. The British Government held that this act defined the extent of its
neutral obligations; and the Confederate agents were therefore safe if they
could evade its specific provisions. This was accomplished successfully by
causing ships to be built and sent out completely prepared for warlike
operations, except that they lacked their battery, ammunition, and full crew.
All that was needed to supply these defects was then sent in another vessel to
an appointed rendezvous outside of British jurisdiction. When the two vessels
met, the guns and other equipments were transferred, and the cruiser became a
Confederate ship-of-war on the spot.
In order to
carry out this plan of operations, it was necessary for the Confederacy to have
its regularly authorized agents abroad. Besides the commissioners, whose mission
was primarily diplomatic, there was, first of all, Captain James D. Bullock, an
officer of the Confederate Navy, who acted for the Navy Department, and whose
name appears to have been used when it was necessary for the Government to be
represented by an accredited agent, as in the sale of the Georgia. Next in
importance came the Liverpool firm of Fraser, Trenholm & Co., a branch of
the Charleston house of John Fraser & Co., the head of which, Trenholm, was
for some time the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury. The Liverpool house was
the authorized depositary of Confederate funds in Europe, and it conducted, on
the other side, the blockade-running and other enterprises in which the
Government at Richmond took a large part. There were other agents, with greater
or less responsibilities at various points, North and Huse in England, Barron,
whom Semmes designates “our Chief of Bureau in Paris," Helm in Cuba,
Heyliger at Nassau, and Walker at Bermuda. These, or most of these, acted
directly for the Government, and their authority was generally understood and
recognized. Besides these, there were others, foreign subjects, sometimes
merchants in good standing, who were ready to act when a third person was
required to carry out a fictitious transfer, or to perform some part in a
transaction which was too delicate for the principals. Sometimes two or three
intermediaries would be employed, each of whom, whatever his suspicions might
be, could swear that he was ignorant of any purpose in contravention of
neutrality; and the different steps in the transaction were adroitly involved
and confused until it became impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to secure
the conviction of any of the guilty parties, on a charge of violation of the
neutrality laws.
The Florida
was the first of the commerce-destroyers of English origin. She was built at
Liverpool in the fall and winter of 1861-62, and ingenious measures were taken
to conceal her ownership and destination. It was given out that she was building
for the Italian Government, her ostensible owner being a merchant of Liverpool
and Palermo. The Italian Consul, however, disclaimed all knowledge of her, and
her pretended destination deceived no one but the English authorities.
Representations made to the Foreign Office by the United States Minister were of
no effect, and on the 22d of March, 1862, the Florida cleared from Liverpool under the name of the Oreto,
and without a cargo, for Palermo and Jamaica. About the same time, the guns and
ammunition for the new cruiser were shipped in the steamer Bahama from
Hartlepool for Nassau.
The Oreto
or Florida arrived at Nassau on the 28th of April. She was consigned to
Adderly & Co. This firm was the Nassau correspondent of Fraser, Trenholm
& Co., of Liverpool, who were notoriously the financial agents of the
Confederate Government in England. Adderly & Co. delivered the vessel to
Maffitt, an officer of the Confederate Navy, who was subsequently placed in
command; and other officers were sent over to join her. She was removed to
Cochrane's Anchorage, nine miles from Nassau, and began to take on board her
arms and ammunition; but this proceeding was presently discontinued, as it would
leave no loophole for the authorities to ignore the character of the vessel.
During this time, and later, she was inspected officially by English naval
officers, who reported that she was "in every respect fitted as a
man-of-war, on the principle of the dispatch gun-vessels in Her Majesty's
service." She was deserted by most of her crew, because they were unwilling
to engage in hostilities, and a new crew was shipped at Nassau.
In view of
these facts the Oreto was libeled in
the Vice-Admiralty Court. The trial
did not reflect credit upon the character of judicial proceedings in the British
colonies. The vessel was released on the 7th of August, and sailed on the same
day, under the command of Maffitt, for Green Cay, an uninhabited island in the
Bahamas. Here she took on board her battery, consisting of two VII-inch rifles,
and six VI-inch guns, with carriages and ammunition, and forthwith proceeded on
her cruise, under the Confederate flag. Maffitt had only been able to obtain a
crew of twenty-two men; and he had no sooner got to sea than the yellow fever
appeared on board. To add to his difficulties, he found that in the hurry of
departure from Nassau, some of the most essential equipments of the battery had
been left behind, and he was without yammers, sponges, sights, locks,
elevating-screws, and other indispensable articles. With great reluctance, he
gave up for the time his intended cruise, and steered for the coast of Cuba.
Avoiding the cruisers, he arrived at Cardenas, his effective crew reduced by
sickness to only' three men. Here he was attacked by the fever, but recovered
after a critical illness. The authorities of Cuba observed their neutral
obligations, and, though Stribling, the first lieutenant of the Florida,
succeeded in getting on board a dozen men under the name of laborers, nothing
could be done to make up the deficiencies of the battery.
After a week
in Cardenas, Maffitt, still prostrated by disease, took the Florida
to Havana. Nothing could be obtained here, and he resolved, as the only course
open to him, to make at once for Mobile. Proceeding directly from Havana, the Florida sighted Fort Morgan and the blockading squadron on the 4th
of September. In view of the helpless condition of the ship, and the crippled
state of her crew and battery, Stribling was in favor of a cautious line of
action, and advised delaying the attempt, at least until night. But Maffitt had
studied the chances, and he decided that the boldest course was the safest.
How the Florida
succeeded in her daring attempt, and how, after four months of rest in Mobile,
she ran the blockade outward on the night of January 16, 1863, has been already
told. In the course of ten days after leaving Mobile she captured three small
vessels, which she burned, after the example set by the Sumter. According to
Maffitt, his “instructions were brief and to the point, leaving much to the
discretion, but more to the torch." On January 26, the Florida
put into Nassau, where her appearance as a ship-of-war must have caused some
confusion to the merchant who had sworn at the trial in July that lie considered
her as a merchant-vessel, and then had delivered her to Maffitt. She was
received, however, with an ovation, allowed to remain thirty-six hours, when the
instructions of the Government limited the time to twenty-four, and took on
board coal for three months, though the authorities had been directed to limit
coal-supplies to a quantity sufficient to enable the belligerent cruiser to
reach the nearest port of her own country. A month later she received one
hundred tons of coal at Barbadoes, in further violation of the instructions,
which forbade a second supply within three months.
The important
part of the Florida's cruise began
with her departure from Barbados. In the space of five months, fourteen prizes
were taken and destroyed, in accordance with the orders of the Confederate
Government. The cruise extended from the latitude of New York to the southward
of Bahia. The neighborhood of the island of Fernando do Noronha was found to be
a fruitful cruising-ground. One of the vessels captured here, the Lapwing,
was laden with two hundred and sixty tons of coal, and Maffitt, by converting
her into a tender, was enabled to supply the wants of his ship without going
into port.
On the 6th of
May, the Florida captured the brig Clarence,
off the coast of Brazil. After putting some light guns on board, and a few men,
Maflitt entrusted the command of the Clarence, now a ship-of-war, to Lieutenant
Read of the Florida, an officer whose
daring and readiness of resource were worthy of Semmes himself. Read proceeded
northward on a roving cruise, along the coast of the United States, and during
the month of June he made lively work of it between the Chesapeake and Portland.
By the 10th he had captured five vessels. Four of these were destroyed. The
fifth was the schooner Tacony, and
finding her better suited to his purpose, Read burned the Clarence, after transferring his guns and crew to the new cruiser.
In the next fortnight, the Tacony made
ten prizes. The last of these, the Archer,
then became a ship-of-war, and the Tacony
shared the fate of the Clarence. The Archer's
career was short. Two days after she was put in commission, Read ran into
Portland with a party of his men in boats, and surprised and cut out the
revenue-cutter Caleb Cushing, which was
lying in the harbor. Next morning, however, he was attacked by steamers which
had been hastily manned and sent out from Portland. As he could not make a
successful resistance, Read set the cutter on fire, and put off in his boats to
the Archer; but he was pursued and
captured, and was shortly after a prisoner in Fort Warren.
After
refitting and coaling at Bermuda in July, the Florida sailed for Brest. Here she remained, nearly six months, and
was docked and thoroughly repaired. Maffitt was relieved by Captain Barney, who
in turn gave place to Captain Morris. The Florida
sailed from Brest in February, and after cruising for four months, put in again
to Bermuda. Here she repaired, and took on board eighty tons of coal, by
permission. Further supplies were taken without permission, the authorities not
bestirring themselves very vigorously to enforce the regulations, and accepting
Morris's statement that Mobile was the first Confederate port he expected to
visit. He did not visit Mobile, whatever may have been his expectations, but
made a second raid of three months on the merchant vessels of the United.
States, this time on their own coast. Crossing the Atlantic, he was at Teneriffe
early in August; and returning, he arrived on the 5th of October at Bahia.
The United
States sloop-of-war Wachusett,
Commander Napoleon Collins, was lying at this time in Bahia. The Florida
came in and anchored near the shore, about half a mile from the Wachusett's
berth. Immediately after her arrival, a Brazilian corvette, in apprehension of a
disturbance, took a position between the two vessels and near the Florida.
The Florida
had received permission to remain in port for forty-eight hours, and Collins
made up his mind to destroy or capture her before the time arrived for her
departure. Accordingly, before daybreak on the morning of the 7th, he got under
way, and crossed the bow of the Brazilian. It was his intention to run the Florida down, and sink her at her anchor; but the plan was
imperfectly carried out, and the Wachusett's
bow, striking the enemy on the starboard quarter, cut down her bulwarks and
carried away her mizzenmast and main-yard, but did not disable her. A few pistol
shots were fired from the Florida, as
the Wachusett backed off, which were
returned with a volley of small arms, and with a discharge from two of the
broadside guns. The Florida then
surrendered.
At the time
of the capture, Captain Morris was on shore, together with a number of the
officers and crew. Lieutenant Porter, who had been left in command, came on
board the Wachusett with sixty-nine
officers and men. A hawser was carried to the Florida, and she was towed out of the harbor. The Wachusett
had three men slightly wounded, the
only casualties in the engagement.
In the
protest subsequently made by the Brazilian Government, it was stated that upon
the discharge of the Wachusett's guns
an officer was sent from the Brazilian corvette to inform Collins that the forts
and vessels would open fire upon him, if he persisted in attacking the Florida.
At this time the capture had been already made. The officer of the deck on board
the Wachusett, according to the
Brazilian account, promised to desist. This statement was denied by the American
officers. The fact that the conversation, whatever it may have been, was carried
on in English and Portuguese, would probably be sufficient to account for a
misunderstanding. The corvette's boat then returned, and the Brazilian captain
fired a gun, "to ratify his intimation," as he expressed it; and all
was quiet again. As the Wachusett
steamed out of the harbor with her prize, the Brazilian made a pro forma
demonstration, without stopping the two vessels, and the latter proceeded by way
of St. Thomas to Hampton Roads. Here the Florida
was sunk, according to the official declaration of the United States Government,
through "an unforeseen accident," after a collision with an army
transport.
The capture
of the Florida was as gross and
deliberate a violation of the rights of neutrals as was ever committed in any
age or country. It is idle to attempt to apologize for it or to explain it; the
circumstances were such that the question does not admit of discussion. All that
can be said is that it was the independent act of an officer, and that it was
disavowed by the Government. In the words of the Secretary of State, it
"was an unauthorized, unlawful, and indefensible exercise of the naval
force of the United States within a foreign country, in defiance of its
established and duly recognized Government." That the action of Collins met
with approval and satisfaction throughout the country, in spite of the official
utterances, is not to be wondered at, considering that communities in general
know little of international law, and in a case of this kind do not stop to
reason about principles. Moreover, the slight regard which, during nearly four
years, neutrals had shown for their obligations toward the United States, and
the use of their own territories which they had permitted to the Southern
cruisers, had aroused in this country a just indignation and a deep-seated sense
of wrong and outrage. Collins refers to the previous conduct of Brazil by way of
justification. He says in his report: ''I thought it probable the Brazilian
authorities would forbear to interfere, as they had done at Fernando de Noronha,
when the rebel steamer Alabama was
permitted to take into the anchorage three American ships, and to take coal from
the Cora [Louisa] Hatch within musket-shot of the fort; and afterward, within
easy range of their guns, to set on fire those unarmed vessels. I regret,
however, to state that they fired three shotted guns at us, while we were towing
the Florida out."
The
imputation of blame cast by Collins's “regret " upon the Brazilian
authorities was unnecessary. What the Brazilian vessels should have done was to
engage the Wachusett, and prevent the
capture. What they attempted to do, apparently, was to pursue such a course of
action and inaction combined as would enable their Government to avoid a
difficulty with either belligerent. That they did not propose to engage the Wachusett
is tolerably clear; but at the same time they did enough to make a diplomatic
defence, in case the Confederacy should ever be in a position to settle accounts
with their Government.
The second
cruiser built in England for the Confederates' was the Alabama, whose career began in July, 1862. The attention of the
Foreign Office had been first called to this vessel by a note from Mr. Adams on
the 23d of June. The evidence then submitted as to her character was confined to
a statement made by the Consul at Liverpool, of suspicious circumstances
connected with the vessel. The communication was referred to the law officers of
the Crown, who gave the opinion that, if the allegations were true, the building
and equipment of the vessel were a "manifest violation of the Foreign
Enlistment Act, and steps ought to be taken to put that act in force and to
prevent the vessel from going to sea." It was added that the Customs
authorities at Liverpool should endeavor to ascertain the truth of the
statements, and that, if sufficient evidence could be obtained, proceedings
should be taken as early as possible. On the 4th of July, the report of the
Customs officers was transmitted to Mr. Adams, tending to show that there was no
sufficient evidence that a violation of the Act was contemplated.
Other
correspondence and opinions followed. On the 21st, affidavits were delivered to
the authorities at Liverpool, one of which, made by a seaman who had been
shipped on board the vessel, declared that Butcher, the captain of the Alabama,
who engaged him, had stated that she was going out to fight for the Confederate
States. Other depositions to the same effect were received on the 23d and 25th,
all of which were referred, as they came in, to the law officers. The latter
rendered the opinion that the evidence of the deponents, coupled with the
character of the vessel, made it reasonably clear that she was intended for
warlike use against the United States; and recommended that she be seized
without loss of time.
Notwithstanding
that the urgency of the case was well known to the Government, and
notwithstanding also that, of the four depositions upon which the law officers
chiefly based their opinion, one had been received on the 21st of July, two
others on the 23d, and the fourth on the 25th, the report was not presented
until the 29th. On that day, however, the Alabama
left Liverpool, without an armament, and ostensibly on a trial trip. She ran
down to Point Lynas, on the coast of Anglesea, about fifty miles from Liverpool.
Here she remained for two days, completing her preparations. On the morning of
the 31st, she got under way and stood to the northward up the Irish
Sea; and, rounding the northern coast of Ireland, she passed out into the
Atlantic.
Among the
innumerable side-issues presented by the case of the Alabama, the facts given above contain the essential point. That the
attention of the British Government was called to the suspicious character of
the vessel on the 23d of June; that her adaptation to warlike use was admitted;
that her readiness for sea was known; that evidence was submitted on the 21st,
the 23d, and finally on the 25th of July that put her character beyond a doubt;
and that in spite of all this, she was allowed to sail on the 29th, make the
real foundation of the case against Great Britain.
The Alabama
arrived at Port Praya, in the Azores, on the 10th of August. Here she was joined
on the 18th by the bark Agrippina of London, bringing her battery, ammunition,
stores, and coal; and two days later the steamer Bahama
came in from Liverpool, with Semmes and the remainder of the officers and crew.
After a week spent at Angra Bay, preparing for the cruise, Semmes left his
anchorage on the 24th of August; and, going a few miles off the coast to be
outside of neutral jurisdiction, he complied with the formalities of putting his
ship in commission. His crew had been shipped at Point Lynas for a fictitious
voyage. Of these, eighty were now re-shipped; and the remainder were obtained
from the men that had come out in the Bahama. Nearly all belonged to Liverpool. Those who were unwilling
to go returned to England in the other vessel; and the Alabama started on her cruise.
The first two
months were spent in the North Atlantic. In this time twenty prizes were taken
and burnt. In one or two cases, there were at least doubts as to the hostile
ownership of the cargo; , but the prize-court of the Confederacy now sat in
Semmes's cabin, and all questions of law and fact were settled by the captain's
decision. The interested neutral in these cases was Great Britain, and Semmes
had doubtless satisfied himself beforehand as to how far he could safely go.
There was no probability that the British Government, after making so little
effort to prevent his departure, would quarrel with him about the destruction of
a cargo of her subjects' merchandise. That Semmes was not mistaken in his
conjecture, is proved by the letter in reference to this point, addressed by
direction of Earl Russell to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. The letter says:
" British property on board a vessel belonging to one of the belligerents
must be subject to all the risks and contingencies of war, so far as the capture
of the vessel is concerned. The owners of any British property, not being
contraband of war, on board a Federal vessel captured and destroyed by a
Confederate vessel of war, may claim in a Confederate prize-court compensation
for the destruction of such property."
However one
may wish to avoid reviving an old grievance, which is now happily a grievance of
the past, it is impossible to avoid comparing the extreme complaisance of the
Foreign Office toward the acts of Semmes—acts
for which a neutral ordinarily demands instant reparation-and its summary action
in the case of the Trent, when the
property of its subjects had been in no way injured. In one case it excused not
only the officer, but the Government under which he was acting; and its
suggestion of a remedy for the owners, in view of the character of prize
proceedings in the Confederacy, was little less than a mockery. In the other
case, it accompanied its diplomatic demands with hostile preparations, and it
encouraged the manufacture of public sentiment in favor of war by withholding
explanatory dispatches. The inference is unavoidable that the Government
deliberately intended to pursue a policy as unfriendly as it could possibly be
without passing the technical bounds of a legal neutrality.
After
cruising as far as the Banks, the Alabama
turned her head southward. Her coal was nearly exhausted, and arrangements had
been made before starting for receiving a fresh supply, from vessels dispatched
for the purpose from England, which were to meet her at dates and places agreed
upon. Arriving on the 18th of November at Fort de France, in the island of
Martinique, Semmes found the Agrippina awaiting him; but he postponed taking in
his coal, and as a precaution, sent her to another rendezvous.
Already, in
October, the San Jacinto, now
commanded by Commander Ronckendorff, had been ordered to cruise in the West
Indies, in search of the Alabama, and
the latter had not been at Martinique a day before the sloop came in. She
carried one XI-inch and ten IX-inch guns; so that in armament the Alabama
was not a match for her. As the Governor of Martinique proposed to enforce the
"twenty-four hours" rule, the San
Jacinto did not come to anchor, but went out to cruise beyond the marine
league, waiting for the enemy to leave the harbor. She did not have long to
wait. On the 20th, early in the evening, the Alabama
put out. Signal was made from an American brig in the harbor, and Semmes was
prepared for a critical moment. But the night was dark, and the San Jacinto was lying well out from the entrance; and though she had
two boats on the watch, the Alabama
got out unobserved. As the San Jacinto,
how, ever, was deficient in speed, she would have had some difficulty in
bringing on an engagement, even if she had met the enemy.
After coaling
at Blanquilla from the Agrippina,
Semmes shaped his course for the Mona Passage and thence for the Windward
Passage. He remained cruising in and near the latter for five days. On the 7th
of December, the Ariel, one of the
mail-steamers for which he had been waiting, was captured, with a large number
of passengers. These he proposed to land at Kingston, before burning the ship,
but the prevalence of yellow fever prevented him from carrying out the plan, and
the steamer was released under heavy ransom-bonds.
After making
some necessary repairs to her engine, the Alabama
passed to the southward and westward, cruising in the Gulf of Honduras and off
the coast of Yucatan. At the Areas, a group of small islands in the Bay of
Campeche, she met another coal-bark. She remained here at anchor for two weeks,
coaling and refitting. Thence, on the 5th of January, 1863, Semmes proceeded to
off the coast of Texas, having formed the bold design of intercepting a part of
the transport fleet, which he supposed would at this time be on its way to
Galveston.
The Alabama
arrived off Galveston at noon on the 11th. It will be remembered that only ten
days before her arrival the unfortunate affair had taken place at that port,
which resulted in the loss of the Harriet
Lane and Westfield, and the
raising of the blockade by two Texan river-steamers. A squadron under Commodore
Henry H. Bell, composed of the Brooklyn,
the Hatteras, and three or four
gunboats, had been hurriedly collected at New Orleans, to resume the blockade,
and several of the vessels had arrived off Galveston shortly before the
appearance of the Alabama. The latter
was sighted from the masthead of the Brooklyn
when about twelve miles off. She had no steam up, nor were any sails set that
could be distinguished. The lookout from the masthead took her for a bark or a
three-masted schooner. The Brooklyn's
fires were out, and new grate-bars were being put in; otherwise she would have
gone in pursuit of the stranger. As it was, the commodore signalled the Hatteras
to chase, and the latter got under way, and steamed in the direction indicated.
In the number
of men on board, the two ships were nearly equal; but the Hatteras
was far from being a match for the, Alabama,
either in her guns or in her construction. She was a mere shell; an iron
side-wheeler, of eleven hundred tons, built for carrying passengers on the Delaware—an "excursion-boat," in short. The armaments of
the two vessels were as follows
HATTERAS
Number of Guns
Weight of Projectiles
4 short 32-pounders (27 cwt.)
128 lbs
2 rifled 30-pounders
60 lbs
1 rifled 20-pounder
20 lbs
1 howitzer
12 lbs
Total, 8 guns
220 lbs.
ALABAMA.
Number of Guns
Weight of Projectiles
6 long 32-pounders (52 cwt.)
192 lbs.
1 rifled 100-pounder (Blakeley)
100 lbs.
1 VIII-inch shell gun
68 lbs.
Total, 8 guns[2]
360 lbs.
The
efficiency of the enemy's battery was quite double that of the Hatteras. Added
to which, the engines and boilers of the Hatteras were exposed to every shot,
while the Alabama's machinery was
protected by coal-bunkers and by its position below the water-line. Moreover,
the Hatteras had no speed; and the ease with. which, toward the end of the
chase, she overhauled the stranger, led her captain, Blake, to suspect that he
was being played with, and that the intention was to draw him away from the
squadron.
If his
suspicions were well founded, however, he had nothing to do but to keep on his
course and fight, and he prepared for a vigorous attack. When he had left the
flagship, between three and four in the afternoon, the chase was not insight
from the Hatteras; and it was only
after he had proceeded some distance that he discovered her to be a bark-rigged
steamer, standing on under topsails away from the bar, and occasionally steaming
a little. The fact was immediately signalled to the flagship, but the signals
were not observed.
At dusk the Alabama
lay to, being then about twenty miles from the squadron, and waited for the
Hatteras to come up. Blake had resolved to run up as close as possible, and if
his surmises were correct, to endeavor to board. With the Alabama
it was his only chance. As he approached he hailed, and the other vessel
replied, giving as her name, "Her Majesty's ship Petrel." This gentle ruse lulled Blake's suspicions, and he
gave orders to send a boat on board the stranger. The Alabama only waited for Blake's reply to her hail, to make sure of
his nationality; and on receiving it, before the boat had gone more than its
length from the ship, she discharged a broadside at the Hatteras.
During the
hailing, Semmes had endeavored to get a raking position astern of the Hatteras,
but the latter had thwarted the attempt. After the firing began, both vessels
moved forward, the Hatteras trying to
get on board; but the Alabama passed
ahead, and Blake, though be came very near―being not more than thirty or
forty yards off at one time―failed to accomplish his object. The firing
was sharp on both sides; but out of fifty shots estimated by Blake to have been
fired from his vessel, only seven hit the mark. One struck the Alabama
under the counter, penetrating as far as a timber, and then glanced off; a.
second struck the funnel; a third passed through both sides; a fourth entered
the lamp room; and the others lodged in the bunkers. None of the shells
exploded. The Alabama's fire, on the
other hand, was most destructive. In the space of a few moments the Hatteras
was riddled like a sieve. Shells were exploded in the hold and the sick bay, and
set them on fire; another shell entered the cylinder; and presently the walking
beam was shot away. Desperate as his position now was, Blake, with the tenacity
that was characteristic of him, held out a few minutes longer, knowing that he
was beaten, yet hoping that some chance might damage his enemy. But the Alabama,
placing herself in an unassailable position on his bow, had him completely at
her mercy, and continued to pour in a galling fire. Whole sheets of iron were
torn off the side of the Hatteras,
allowing a volume of water to enter; and with his ship on fire in two places,
and sinking fast, and his engine and pumps disabled, Blake saw that a few
moments of delay would only result in the sacrifice of all on board, and gave up
the hopeless struggle.
The action
had lasted thirteen minutes. At its close, the crew of the Hatteras were hastily removed, and, ten minutes after they had left
the ship she went down bow foremost. The Brooklyn,
Sciota, and Cayuga, soon after the beginning of the fight, had got under way,
and steered in the direction of the flashes; but they cruised all night without
meeting anything, while the Alabama
was steadily holding her course to Jamaica. On her way back to Galveston the
next morning, the Brooklyn discovered
the masts of a wreck, standing upright, with the tops awash; and only by a mark
on the hurricane-deck, which was found adrift, was the wreck identified as that
of the ill-fated Hatteras.
The Alabama
now put in to Port Royal, Jamaica, where she landed her prisoners and repaired
damages. The latter were not serious, and the ship remained only five days in
port. After burning two prizes, the crews of which were landed at San Domingo,
Semmes shaped his course for a point on the great highway of South American
commerce, near the equator. He remained in this neighborhood two months, and
captured eight vessels. All of these were destroyed except one, the Louisa
Hatch, which was loaded with coal.
Proceeding to the Brazilian island of Fernando de Noronha, with the Hatch
in company, he coaled in the harbor from his prize. He then took her out and
burned her. While lying in the port two American ships arrived outside, and the Alabama was permitted, without any remonstrance from the
authorities, to run out and destroy them, returning the same day to the harbor.
These were the acts to which Collins afterward referred, in excusing his capture
of the Florida. The Brazilian
authorities clearly neglected their duty in allowing this violation of
neutrality to pass without remonstrance or interference, but as far as the case
of the Florida is concerned, one wrong
cannot be said to justify another.
Semmes now
cruised for two months-his usual time for remaining in one locality on the coast
of Brazil, stopping for a fortnight at Bahia. Ten prizes were added to his list
in this period. One of these, the bark Conrad, was taken into the Confederate service as a tender, armed
with two captured 12-pounders, and put in commission at sea under the name of
the Tuscaloosa. About the first of
July the two vessels proceeded to the Cape of Good Hope, where they arrived on
the 29th. The Alabama remained in the
neighborhood of the Cape until the 24th of September, occasionally putting in at
Cape Town or at Simon's Bay.
A question
arose at Cape Town in reference to the character of the Tuscaloosa. As prizes could not be brought by the cruisers of either
belligerent into British ports, the Tuscaloosa,
if a prize, would be excluded. Semmes claimed for her all the privileges of a
commissioned ship-of-war, and the civil authorities were inclined to side with
him. Sir Baldwin Walker, however, the admiral commanding at the Cape, took an
opposite view, and wrote to the governor that "to bring a captured vessel
under the denomination of a vessel-of-war, she must be fitted for warlike
purposes, and not merely have a few men and a few small guns put on board her
(in fact, nothing but a prize-crew), in order to disguise her real character as
a prize. Now, this vessel has her original cargo of wool still on board. . . .
Viewing all the circumstances of the case, they afford room for the supposition
that the vessel is styled a tender, with the object of avoiding the prohibition
against her entrance as a prize into our ports, where, if the captors wished,
arrangements could be made for the disposal of her valuable cargo."
The Admiral's
straightforward opinion was overruled; but when the case was reported, the Tuscaloosa
having then left Cape Town, the Home Government instructed the governor that the
vessel was a prize, and should have been detained. These instructions were
calculated to afford a cheap satisfaction to the United States, without injuring
the Confederates. Unfortunately, the Tuscaloosa
disturbed the calculation by again coming into port, after a cruise to Brazil,
and the colonial governor proceeded to detain her, in accordance with the
instructions of his superiors. This was not at all what the Home Government
wanted; and it immediately disavowed the act, and ordered the restoration of the
Tuscaloosa to Lieutenant Low, her,
commander, on the ground that "having been once allowed to enter and leave
the port, he was fairly entitled to assume that he might do so a second
time." Comment on these proceedings is hardly necessary.
Having made
arrangements soon after his arrival at Cape Town for the sale of the Sea Bride,
his latest prize, and of the Tuscaloosa's
cargo, Semmes retired with his vessels to Angra Pequena, a point on the west
coast of Africa, outside of civilized jurisdiction, and made the transfers. The Tuscaloosa
was then ordered to the coast of Brazil. After cruising for two weeks off the
Cape, Semmes put into Simon's Bay. Here he learned that the Vanderbilt,
under Commander Baldwin, was cruising in search of him, having left the Bay only
five days before. Being satisfied that his pursuer would not return, he remained
in port a week, making preparations for his projected cruise to the East Indies.
During this stay in port, he shipped eleven men, to make up for losses by
desertion.
It is not
necessary to go into the details of this part of the cruise. It lasted six
months, and resulted in the capture and destruction of seven vessels. First
running due south until she struck the fortieth parallel, the Alabama
then steered to the northward and eastward for the Straits of Sunda. She watched
the Straits for a time, and next crossed the China Sea to Condore, an island off
the coast of Cochin-China. Returning by way of Singapore, the Malabar coast, and
Mozambique Channel, she found herself on the 20th of March again at the Cape.
Thence she sailed on the 24th for Europe.
In
consequence of the appearance of the Alabama
and Florida, the Navy Department, in
September, 1862, had set about making a systematic effort to put a stop to the
depredations of the commerce-destroyers. A flying squadron was fitted out to
cruise in the West Indies, and the command was given to Captain Charles Wilkes.
In its instructions, dated September 8, 1862, the Department, after recounting
the fitting-out of the Alabama and Florida,
and the fact that they were cruising in the West. Indies, went on to say:
“The
Department has information that other vessels are destined for similar purposes
in the same quarter, and it is therefore essential that prompt and vigorous
measures be adopted for annihilating these lawless depredators by their capture,
and, if necessary, destruction. You have been selected to command a squadron for
this purpose. . . ."
The
instructions designated the West Indies and Bahamas as the cruising ground, and
named the sloops-of-war Wachusett and Dacotah,
the double-enders Cimmerone, Sonoma, Tioga, and Octorara,
and the fast side-wheel steamer Santiago
de Cuba as the vessels
that were to compose the squadron. Of these only the Wachusett and the Dacotah
were fitted to cope singly with the Alabama;
but other suitable vessels were subsequently added to the squadron.
Wilkes sailed
from Hampton Roads in the Wachusett on
the 24th of September. His cruise lasted about nine months. During two months of
this time, the Alabama was in the same
waters; while the Florida, when she
left Mobile, ran directly into his cruising ground. But Wilkes was unable to
find them; and the main purpose of his cruise, the capture of the
commerce-destroyers, was never carried out.
First and
last, Wilkes had sixteen vessels under his command. He made some captures of
neutral vessels engaged in contraband trade, and he worried from time to time
the English steamers in the West Indies, thereby causing unnecessary friction.
He incurred the displeasure of the Department by several unwarranted acts, but
particularly by the retention of vessels, as a part of his command, which
belonged to other squadrons or had been ordered on special service. The Oneida
and the Cuyler, which had been sent in pursuit of the Florida after her escape from Mobile, were among the vessels
appropriated in this way; and Farragut was led to express himself strongly on
the subject, and to suggest that if any of Wilkes's ships came into his
neighborhood, he should adopt a similar line of action. But the fatal mistake
made by Wilkes was in detaining the Vanderbilt;
and in consequence of this and other causes of dissatisfaction, he was relieved
in June, 1863, by Commodore Lardner.
After the Alabama
had reached the West Indies, in November, 1862, it was foreseen that she could
not remain long in that quarter; and the Vanderbilt,
one of the fastest steamers in the navy, was fitted out to cruise under
Commander Baldwin, with a roving commission, in the direction it was supposed
she would take. The orders of the Department to Baldwin, dated January 27, 1863,
when the Alabama was on her way to her
cruising ground near the equator, show with what remarkable foresight Semmes's
movements were predicted, and his probable cruise mapped out.
The orders
read: "You will first visit Havana, where you may obtain information to
govern your further movements. You can then visit any of the islands of the West
Indies, or any part of the Gulf, at which you- think you would be most likely to
overtake the Alabama, or procure
information of her. When you are perfectly satisfied that the Alabama
has left the Gulf or the West Indies, and gone to some other locality, you will
proceed along the coast of Brazil to Fernando de Noronha, and Rio do Janeiro,
making inquiry at such places as you may deem advisable. From Rio continue your
course to the Cape of Good Hope, thence back to St. Helena, Cape de Verde, the
Canaries, Madeira, Lisbon, Western Islands, and New York. If at any point word
is obtained of the Alabama or any
other rebel craft, you will pursue her without regard to these
instructions."
This
judicious plan was defeated by Wilkes. On the 28th of February, the Vanderbilt,
after looking in at Martinique and Guadaloupe, fell in with the Wachusett
off St. Thomas. Wilkes thereupon left the Wachusett,
and transferring his flag to the Vanderbilt,
proceeded to Havana. He was much pleased with his new acquisition. On the 20th
of March he wrote the Department: "I cannot well describe to you the
efficiency of this steamer, and the excellent condition of discipline she is in,
and the many advantages she offers for this particular cruising. Her speed is
much beyond that of any other steamer I know of, and her armament is equal to
anything she can possibly have to encounter."[3]
Nothing would induce Wilkes to part with her, until the 13th of June, when, in
obedience to peremptory orders from the Department, he allowed her to go on her
cruise. She proceeded directly to the coast of Brazil. But it was now too late:
the bird had flown. The Alabama. had
been at Fernando de Noronha on the 10th of April, and at Bahia on the 11th of
May; and by the 1st of July she had left the South American coast altogether.
Touching at
the Brazilian ports, Baldwin found himself everywhere -upon the track of the
enemy, but a month behind her. He followed her to the Cape of Good Hope,
stopping on the way at St. Helena. At the Cape Semmes eluded him successfully;
and the cruise of the Vanderbilt, from
which so much had been expected, produced no substantial result.
At the very
time that the Alabama left the Cape
and disappeared in the Indian Ocean, the United States sloop-of-war
Wyoming was cruising in the neighborhood of the Straits of Sunda, to
protect the commerce passing over the great highway to the China Sea. Two days
before the Alabama arrived in the
Straits the Wyoming was lying at
Batavia,one hundred miles to the eastward. When the Wyoming put to sea, Semmes doubled on her, and himself ran down into
the Java Sea north of Batavia. The Wyoming
returned to Batavia, and Semmes made his way to the China Sea. During the first
week in December, the sloop was at Singapore and Johore, while Semmes was
refitting at Condore, to the northward. Late in the same month, Semmes, on his
way home, put in to Singapore, and remained there four days. But by this time
the Wyoming was off on a false chase
to Manila, twelve hundred miles away to the northeast, and the opportunity of
meeting the Alabama was gone forever.
The Alabama
arrived at Cherbourg from the Cape of Good Hope on the 11th of June. Here Semmes
proposed to have her docked and thoroughly repaired; but permission was delayed,
and the vessel was still lying in the harbor when, on the 14th, the sloop-of-war
Kearsarge, commanded by Captain John A. Winslow, steamed into
Cherbourg. The Kearsarge was lying at
Flushing when the news reached, her of the Alabama's
arrival; and she immediately proceeded to Cherbourg, in the hope of an
engagement. After sending a boat ashore, she steamed out of the harbor without
anchoring; and, taking her station outside, maintained a close watch for the
enemy, in case he should attempt to escape.
But Semmes
had no intention of running away. After warring so long on unarmed
merchant-ships, he could not afford to decline the battle that was so pointedly
offered him by a vessel with which he was nearly matched. His English friends,
who had stood by him loyally hitherto, though he gave them much to carry, would
have been compelled to disown him if he had shirked the encounter. He met the
occasion squarely, and wrote a letter to a resident of Cherbourg, by which the
United States Consul was definitely informed of his intention to engage the Kearsarge.
For four days
the Alabama was occupied with
preparations for battle; and between nine and ten o'clock on the morning of the
19th, she came out of the harbor. The weather was fine, with a slight haze. It
was Sunday, Semmes's p0 lucky day; "but for once his luck had deserted him.
Perhaps he had some apprehensions of this kind, as he sent ashore all his
valuables, including his captured chronometers, and his collection of
ransom-bills, which were to be paid after the recognition of the Confederacy.
The Kearsarge was lying three miles
off the eastern entrance, as the Alabama
came down to the west of the breakwater, escorted as far as the marine league by
the Couronne, a French iron-clad
which was to guard the neutrality of the territorial waters. Following the two
vessels was an English yacht, the Deerhound.
Semmes's purpose had been made public, and the shore was covered with throngs of
people, wherever a spot could be found, to witness the fight.
As the Alabama
came out, the Kearsarge steamed off
shore, to be well outside the neutral limits, and to prevent Semmes from finding
a refuge if the battle went against him. On reaching a point seven miles from
the land, the Kearsarge, at 10:50, was
turned short around, and steered for the enemy.
The armament
of the two ships was as follows:
KEARSARGE
Number of Guns
Weight of Projectiles
4 short 32-pounders
128 lbs.
2 XI-inch pivots (smooth-bore)
272 lbs.
1 30-pounder (rifle)
30 lbs.
__________
_______
7 guns
430 lbs.
ALABAMA
Number of Guns.
Weight of Projectiles
6 long 32-pounders (52 cwt.)
192 lbs.
1 rifled 100-pounder (Blakeley)
100 lbs.
1 VIII-inch shell-gun
68 lbs.
__________
_______
8 guns
360 lbs.
In the matter
of speed, that primary essential of a ship-of-war, the Kearsarge had
somewhat the advantage. The difference in the number of men, 163 in the Kearsarge
and 149 in the Alabama (including
officers in both cases), was not material. Both ships had their batteries
pivoted to starboard; and the Alabama
fought seven guns on her engaged side, while the Kearsarge
fought five. As to the size of the ships, the tonnage of the Kearsarge
was 1,031, and that of the Alabama
1,016, by the old system of measurement. They were, therefore, in most respects
closely matched; and in regard to the comparative strength of their armaments,
it can only be said that each carried what was considered by those who fitted
her out the most effective battery for a ship of that size.
As soon as
the Kearsarge had turned to approach
her, the Alabama opened fire, from a
raking position, at a distance of a mile. This was at 10.57. The Kearsarge
came on at full speed, receiving a second broadside, and part of a third. Coming
within nine hundred yards, she sheered off and returned the enemy's fire with
her starboard battery. At this point, she took the offensive and endeavored to
pass astern of the Alabama and rake
her; but the latter prevented the manoeuvre by sheering, still keeping her
starboard broadside to the sloop. These tactics were continued throughout the
action. Both vessels circled about a common centre, keeping broadside to
broadside, and apparently heading in opposite directions, but in reality
following each other on their circular course. In this way, they made seven com,
plete revolutions, the Kearsarge under
a full head of steam, always endeavoring to close and rake, and the Alabama edging around, and keeping only her broadside exposed.
The crew of
the Alabama had had little practice in
firing at a target, having been compelled to husband their ammunition, and the
warfare in which they had been engaged for eighteen months not being of a kind
that called for expertness in gunnery. Their firing at the beginning was rapid
and wild, though it became steadier toward the close. The crew of the Kearsarge,
on the other hand, under the thorough training of Thornton, her efficient
executive, made excellent practice, firing with deliberateness and precision.
They had been instructed to point the heavy guns rather below than above the
water-line, leaving it to the 32-pounders to sweep the decks. The two XI-inch
guns, and especially the after gun, played havoc with the enemy. The two ships
gradually neared in their revolutions, until they were only five or six hundred
yards apart. At this distance, the 100-pounder rifle of that day was no match
for the heavier smooth-bores, in an engagement between wooden vessels; and the
sides of the Alabama were torn out by
shells and her decks covered with killed and wounded. The crew of her after
pivot-gun was renewed four times during the action, and nearly every man that
had served it was disabled.
At noon,
after the action had been continued hotly for an hour, the Alabama ceased firing, and headed for the shore, then five miles
distant. This exposed her port' side, which was blown out by the XI-inch shells,
and only two guns could be brought to bear, one of which had been shifted from
the other side. The ship was filling rapidly, and as the water was rising in the
fire-room, Semmes set his fore-trysail
and jibs, in the hope of escaping into neutral waters. The Kearsarge steered to cross his bow, and she was rapidly approaching,
when Semmes saw that the end had come, and struck his flag. The Kearsarge
then stopped, "uncertain whether Captain Semmes was not using some
ruse," as Winslow reports, and because it was not quite clear whether the
flag had been hauled down or shot away. A white flag was then displayed, and the
fire of the Kearsarge ceased. Presently the Alabama
renewed her fire; and the Kearsarge,
in consequence, opened again and fired three or four times. All this time the
white flag was flying. Semmes afterward made bitter complaints of this violation
of the laws of war; but it was perfectly justified by the firing of the Alabama
after she had made the signal of surrender.
It was now a
little past noon, and the Alabama was
settling perceptibly. A boat came alongside the Kearsarge to announce the surrender, and to ask assistance for the
sinking vessel. The only two boats in the ship that were not disabled were
lowered and sent to bring off the officers and crew; and the Alabama's
boat was allowed to go back for the same purpose, the officer commanding the
boat having given his pledge that he would return. He did not return, however;
and the incident is another instance of the results which are likely to attend
the pledging or paroling of prisoners during an engagement, or before possession
has been taken of a vanquished enemy.
At this moment the Deerhound approached. She had been hitherto a spectator of the action. Winslow hailed the yacht, asking her to assist in bringing off the people of the